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Private governance of ocean resources 
Rolf A. Groeneveld, Simon R. Bush and Megan Bailey 
 
Introduction 
The United Nations (UN) post-2015 development agenda (United Nations 2015) calls 
for the establishment of a global partnership for sustainable development, ‘bringing 
together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and 
other actors and mobilizing all available resources’ (Art. 39). The agenda thereby 
explicitly acknowledges that in addition to governments, private companies and civil 
society have a pivotal role to play in attaining the new Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). 
 The natural resource economics literature has traditionally applied a strict 
dichotomy between public actors (that is, governments) and private institutions, notably 
markets: markets take care of the allocation of private goods and services, while 
governments uphold the legal framework within which markets operate and correct 
market failures such as public goods, monopolies, and limited excludability of natural 
resources (see, for example, Perman et al. 2011; Tietenberg and Lewis 2012). The task 
of managing ocean resources has thus in recent history fallen squarely on the shoulders 
of the nation state. However, we have seen for complex systems, such as fisheries and 
marine ecosystems, that this dichotomy does not always hold (Ostrom 2010). Rather, 
the work of Ostrom and others (for example, Folke et al. 2005; Galaz et al. 2012) points 
to what is referred to as polycentric governance, where private and community 
institutional structures, sometimes integrated with and sometimes separate from the 
state, are offering new solutions to global governance challenges. These developments 
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are blurring the strict separation of responsibilities between states, companies and, to an 
increasing extent, civil society. 
 For oceans, a range of sustainability governance arrangements have emerged in 
the last decade that sees new kinds of interaction between public and private actors. 
These interactions have arisen, in part, from the realization that oceans governance 
involves more than just management. Instead it requires diverse and effective 
institutions and is connected to ideas of values and principles (Symes 2006). Prominent 
examples of such initiatives are fisheries certification and seafood recommendation 
lists, where consumers are informed on sustainability aspects of fisheries and 
aquaculture products, and traceability schemes, where consumers can obtain detailed 
information on how and where their fish was caught (for example, Parkes et al. 2010; 
Bailey et al. 2016b). Moreover, rather than being strictly commercial or idealist, these 
sustainability initiatives are often the result of cooperation between private companies 
and civil society. For example, one of the most prolific fisheries certification 
programmes, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), was formed through a 
partnership between the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Unilever. However, 
observing that these initiatives exist does not explain why these interactions develop, 
what kinds of interactions they entail, or the extent to which decision-making control 
shifts back and forth between public and private actors and institutions. 
 In this chapter, we explore the rise of private sustainability initiatives in 
governing the oceans, evaluate the consequences of this movement and speculate on 
what it means for the future of state governance at both national and international levels. 
We do this by first describing three different private initiatives. Two of these, fisheries 
eco-certification and traceability schemes, are more commonly identified. The third, 
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entrepreneurial marine protected areas (EMPAs), has received relatively little attention. 
We then synthesize these cases and reflect on their implication for the role of private 
companies, civil society and consumers in ocean governance. 
 
Fisheries certification 
Sustainability certification is perceived as a market-based governance arrangement that 
verifies compliance with normative standards that allow firms to advocate, steer and 
claim value over improved sustainability performance in the market. Certification is 
increasingly prominent across a broad range of sectors related to the marine 
environment, including the MSC for fisheries, the Aquaculture Stewardship Council 
(ASC) for aquaculture, and Blue Flag certification for beach and marina tourism (see, 
for example, Parkes et al. 2010; McKenna et al. 2011). Certification incorporates the 
setting of standards for ecological and social interactions, the auditing systems that 
measure compliance against these standards, attaching labels to products and enterprises 
which meet the standards, and creating institutions to coordinate these various functions 
(Hatanaka et al. 2005). While these functions are increasingly being coordinated by 
private organizations, such as firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), they 
also involve states in a number of ways. 
 Sustainability certification is generally believed to have emerged under two very 
different narratives related to state regulation. The first narrative is that certification has 
emerged in response to the difficulties that states, in particular in developing countries, 
have had in effectively regulating public marine resources such as fisheries. By setting 
‘higher’ standards than state legislation, NGO-led certification is argued to incentivize 
governments to ‘ratchet up’ their regulatory performance (Cashore et al. 2007). The 
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second narrative argues that certification has emerged in response to over-regulation by 
states. By capping standards at an agreed minimum, industry seeks to avoid an inflation 
of the requirements for production. One noted consequence of this strategy is a so-called 
race-to-the-bottom, as firms bargain what constitutes minimum performance (Nadvi and 
Wältring 2002). However, while examples of these processes have been documented for 
fisheries and aquaculture (see, for example, Béné 2005), the interaction between 
certification is increasingly complex, with multiple forms of interactions and with 
different kinds of regulatory outcomes at both the national and international levels. 
 The interaction of certification with states is increasingly observed as a dynamic 
process of interaction, learning and improvement. For example, the implementation of 
MSC certification has resulted in a range of outcomes related to state involvement. As a 
variety of examples have demonstrated, states are clients, assessors, data providers and 
facilitators of certification (Ponte 2008; Foley 2013; Foley and Hébert 2013). Seen as 
such, states are far from ‘standard takers’, and instead contribute fundamentally to how 
private certification is assembled and operates (Gale and Haward 2011). However, a 
counter-movement is also observed, where states are opposing private standards by 
developing their national standards in response to concerns over cost and sovereignty. 
For example, Iceland and the US state of Alaska have both developed a state-based 
standard – the first for cod and the latter for salmon fisheries – in direct response and 
opposition to what they see as unnecessary costs associated with MSC assessment and 
marketing (Gulbrandsen 2009; Foley and Hébert 2013). Developing countries are also 
creating national standards, but unlike Iceland and the US these efforts are motivated by 
concerns that segments of their fishing and aquaculture industries are unable to comply 
with the international standards, and as such be excluded from the market. For example, 
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in Thailand the government has developed the government-run and certified Thai 
Shrimp Label, while other governments in Southeast Asia have invested in Better 
Management Practice (BMP) and/or Good Aquaculture Practice (GAP) standards 
(Vandergeest 2007; Ha and Bush 2010). Both of these schemes are more inclusive of 
small-holders than the international schemes, but they are also constrained by a lack of 
recognition in export markets. Moreover, as noted by Vandergeest and Unno (2012), the 
standards imposed on fisheries and environmental policy by international certification 
bodies (often based in developed countries) have resonated with notions of an extension 
of extra-sovereign control. 
 At the international level, states are also closely implicated in private 
certification. First, there are examples of states coming together in different regional 
treaties and configurations to act as clients for MSC certification. The recent Parties to 
the Nauru Agreement (PNA) certification of transboundary purse seine fisheries 
targeting skipjack tuna without the use of fish aggregation devices (FADs) is a case in 
point. Here the PNA states have applied as the client for MSC certification in a public–
private partnership with a Dutch-based company to market fish under the Pacifical 
brand (Moody Marine Limited 2011; Adolf et al. 2016). In doing so the PNA sought to 
strengthen the credibility and authority of transboundary conservation and management 
measures that, although now well established, were controversial and resisted at the 
broader regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) level (see Miller et al. 
2014), as well as to regain a degree of normative and therefore sovereign control over 
the fishery from the distant water fleets subject to MSC compliance. Second, the MSC 
has in always sought strong state oversight for their own legitimacy from 
intergovernmental organizations. The first draft of the MSC standards were explicitly 
 6 
 
linked to a range of international agreements, including the United Nations Agreement 
on Highly Migratory Stocks and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. From its inception the MSC has therefore drawn on 
the legitimacy of these intergovernmental institutions for their legitimacy and authority 
(Tamm Hallström and Boström 2010; Foley 2012). Perhaps somewhat ironically, these 
same intergovernmental institutions are now being used by private firms, notably 
supermarkets, to set new benchmarking or ‘meta-standards’ over the MSC and other 
fisheries and aquaculture standards under the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative. Not 
only does this create a continued counter-movement against the MSC, it further blurs 
the boundaries of where and how public and private rules, legitimacy and authority play 
out in sustainability certification. 
 
Traceability 
Traceability, the structured transfer of information in value chains (Coff et al. 2008), has 
emerged as a way of addressing food safety risks, as well as the weak transparency of 
fisheries sustainability in many parts of the world. Traceability is not the information 
itself, but rather the system or tool that makes the flow of this information possible and 
allows for records of production and product movement to be accessible at a future date 
and at distant places (Donnelly and Olsen 2012). Traceability originated as a business 
management tool, where information flowed internally between supply chain actors, and 
supply chain efficiencies helped incentivize its early adoption (Caswell 1998). Once a 
voluntary process, basic traceability is now a requirement in most export-oriented 
seafood value chains purely for health and safety reasons, and while traceability 
originally focused on product attributes alone, the demand for sustainability information 
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about the production process, especially by consumers and buyers, has required an 
evolution of these systems. Thus a new form of next generation traceability, which is 
voluntary and initiated by private actors, has taken off in recent years. 
 Consumer-facing traceability (CFT) includes the flow of information to 
consumers or civil society directly from value-chain actors, and is known as a form of 
transparency through disclosure, or informational governance (Mol 2015; Bailey et al. 
2016a). Determining seafood product characteristics such as quality, origin and 
sustainability, known as credence attributes, can be almost impossible for buyers 
without some help (Wessels 2002). In many ways traceability has emerged largely in 
response to NGO-driven informational demands related to these intangible product 
characteristics and qualities (Jacquet et al. 2010). Consumer-facing traceability can 
serve as a platform that connects consumers directly with the source of, and information 
about, their seafood. However, the term CFT is presently all-encompassing but many 
systems have varying degrees of ‘faceability’ (Miller 2014). Some systems are 
developed by vertically integrated companies that display static information, and are 
based on proprietary databases. Other systems are outsourced to traceability providers 
and are used by both retailers and processors to organize seafood traceability (Fiorillo 
2014). A final group of systems provide dynamic non-proprietary information and allow 
for direct two-way communication between fishers and consumers. While all of these 
systems are consumer-facing, ‘the detail of and access to information differs, and as 
such, so does the degree of transparency they offer to consumers’ (Bailey et al. 2016a, p 
28). Further to this, verification of claims made has not evolved to the same extent as it 
has in certification schemes, for example, those discussed above. Consumer-facing 
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traceability thus has the potential to steer consumption towards traceable items, but 
offers no guarantees that the information it provides is correct. 
 Yet while it is led by civil society actors, and operationalized by private industry 
actors, traceability is also a system of interest to states, and a system that can strengthen 
state governance. The US and the European Union (EU) are particularly focused on 
promoting traceability as a method of combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing (IUU). Here, traceability for regulatory purposes (Coff et al. 2008) becomes a 
means of validating product origin and species for exporting and importing countries 
with information flowing from value-chain actors to governments or regulators. 
Furthermore, it can be a tool to combat seafood mislabelling and fraud (Jacquet and 
Pauly 2008), which can be costly to the public and to private firms. State leadership in 
the design of these types of traceability systems, and the information these systems 
contain, will likely be necessary. However, unilateral state interventions, for example 
traceability requirements demanded by the US, are likely to cause unnecessary 
informational and capacity burdens on many seafood-exporting countries (Bailey et al. 
2016a). Rather, multi-lateral public–private partnerships may be required to effectively 
harness the potential that traceability may have in governing ocean sustainability. 
 
Entrepreneurial Marine Protected Areas 
The involvement of private actors in the establishment of marine protected areas has 
steadily increased in recent decades as the need for sustainable funding models for 
conservation has become apparent (Christie and White 2007). In these so-called 
‘entrepreneurial marine protected areas’ (EMPAs) (Colwell 1997), private actors seek 
business opportunities that fund a combination of conservation activities as well as the 
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livelihoods of local resource users (Colwell 1998; de Groot and Bush 2010; Bottema 
and Bush 2012). The activities of these private entrepreneurs range from collecting 
diver fees to fund park management (Dixon et al. 1993; Tongson and Dygico 2004; de 
Groot and Bush 2010), to the design and implementation of co-management 
arrangements in state designated parks (Teh et al. 2008), and to varying degrees of 
private tenure over spatially delimited marine habitat (Svensson et al. 2010). However, 
while the number of these EMPAs has increased, the extent to which they can 
successfully implement area-based conservation measures depends in large part on legal 
recognition from the state. 
 The initial ambition of EMPAs was to stimulate the expansion of state-led 
marine protected areas (MPAs) in tropical developing countries, where establishment 
has generally been slow and/or dysfunctional. Colwell’s (1997, p. 110) initial 
description involved networks of small-scale protected areas managed by partnerships 
between local communities and private operators which ‘have a vested economic 
interest in promoting abundant marine life’. He further indicated that these small areas 
might be developed within or in combination with state-led MPAs, but bring with them 
the added benefit of protecting discrete pockets of habitat. The role of private actors in 
these EMPAs is variously characterized as: a short-term intervention that raises local 
awareness and builds capacity towards the development of state-led protected areas 
(Colwell 1998); a way of providing alternative income to communities in and around 
these areas, and by doing so reducing extractive pressure on marine resources (Dixon et 
al. 1993; Christie and White 2007); and/or a source of long-term funding for 
conservation activities (Bottema and Bush 2012). 
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 The areal basis of EMPAs inevitably requires some degree of enclosure of 
public resources. Opportunities for private actors (the so-called ‘entrepreneurs’) are 
therefore dependent on support or changes to politics, policy and/or regulation from 
local to national levels. They are also dependent on their ability to successfully generate 
both individual and communal benefits, ensuring that local communities, as well as 
state actors, see both conservation and well-being at least maintained, and preferably 
increased (see Bush et al. 2017). The capacity of EMPAs to provide long-term solutions 
for marine conservation is therefore dependent on their capacity to deliver these 
benefits, which in turn influences the overall legitimacy in the eyes of both community 
and state actors. Because the authority of EMPAs is based on concessions or lease-hold 
arrangements over coastal habitat, they also remain dependent on community and state 
actors for cooperation around the compliance and enforcement of exclusion-related 
conservation rules. Even where state support is highly institutionalized, the durability of 
the EMPAs is subject to changes in national level support for private marine tenure. In 
some cases leases remain vulnerable to political change (for example, Riedmiller and 
Carter 2001) and in other cases local-level authority may shift to higher or lower levels 
of government (for example, Midavaine 2014), with different priorities than those that 
initially granted legitimacy and authority. Private control over marine conservation is 
therefore dependent on the state, given that it is the state that provides the institutional 
space for entrepreneurs to exploit and consolidate opportunities, while also ensuring 
they are able to contribute to the stewardship of public habitat and resources. Without a 
clear framework for state collaboration and support these private sustainability 
entrepreneurs are unlikely to be able to establish EMPAs as spatially delimited 
institutions around the conservation of marine resources over the long term. 
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 There is also a global ambition to establish a network of MPAs, covering 10 per 
cent of the world’s oceans by 2020 (see Rife et al. 2013), as set out by the Convention 
on Biodiversity. The vision for achieving this target is based on a global network of 
MPAs spread across a range of habitats. But echoing the same critiques levelled at 
national-level MPAs, progress has been slow, funding inadequate and regulatory control 
weak (for example, Kearney et al. 2013; Roff 2014; White et al. 2014). It is enticing to 
consider whether EMPAs could contribute to this global network, but two major 
barriers stand in the way. First, EMPAs are dependent to a large extent on the kinds of 
local institutional dynamics outlined above, making any globally coherent strategy 
dependent on the same states that have not pushed the current CBD goal forward. 
Second, EMPAs appear to be a very ‘national’ solution, because it appears unlikely that 
there is a business case for private intervention in areas beyond national jurisdiction far 
from consumers (that is, tourists). As variously argued (for example, Mascia et al. 2010; 
Selig and Bruno 2010; Chuenpagdee et al. 2013), meeting the national and global 
demands for MPA establishment remains firmly linked to the local contexts within 
which conservation activities are embedded. 
 
Understanding public–private sustainability governance 
The consensus among economists is that government intervention is warranted, among 
others, in the presence of market failures (see, for example, Perman et al. 2011). These 
failures include, but are not limited to, externalities and public goods. Marine resources 
can in many ways be considered a common pool resource, and in this respect the 
emergence of private governance, where private parties contribute to the provision of 
the common good, may seem puzzling. Looking more closely at the cases discussed, 
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however, three key insights emerge that help us to understand this development: (1) 
ocean governance is not only a public good, but also a marketable product attribute, 
especially in international markets; (2) ocean governance is increasingly about 
sustainability partnerships that complement the abilities of markets and governments; 
and (3) private governance should not be seen as supplanting state governance of 
marine resources, but rather as a complementary movement that can help strengthen 
states. We discuss these insights below. 
 
Ocean Governance as a Product Attribute 
The limitation of states to either effectively oversee and regulate the marine 
environment, or contribute regulation that supports the common good, opens up 
opportunities for private actors and governance mechanisms in the marine environment. 
In many ways, private governance has emerged during a time of increased 
individualism within society. The citizen-consumer is now being counted on to exercise 
his or her citizenry (Iles 2004) and to change the infrastructures of consumption (van 
den Burg et al. 2003). So private governance links with an increasing sense of 
individual responsibility in a time of increasing information availability. Such 
individualism is evident in all three cases. Certification is seen as a form of ethical or 
political consumerism, consumer traceability assumes a similar demand for knowing 
where and how fish are caught or produced, and EMPAs are driven by an assumption of 
funding from ethical tourism. 
 Peattie (2010) discusses 13 different factors that are thought to influence ‘green’ 
consumption, such as economic rationality, environmental knowledge and social norms. 
Drawing from these factors we can distinguish three broad types of motivation for 
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consumers to consume ‘green’ products, such as certified or traceable goods: (1) the 
good’s instrumental value to the consumer; (2) social motivations pertaining to the 
relation between the consumer and his or her peers; and (3) ethical motivations to ‘do 
the right thing’. The instrumental value can include qualities such as taste or food 
safety; we might argue that consumers also get a ‘warm glow’ from buying a product 
labelled as environmentally friendly (see, for example, Hartmann and Apaolaza-Ibáñez 
2012), although such considerations would be difficult to separate from sincerely moral 
considerations. Social motivations include such motivations as conforming to a social 
norm (‘this is common practice‘) and identifying with a lifestyle that includes 
consumption of the ‘green’ product (or refusal to consume the ‘non-green’ variety). 
Finally, ethical motivations regard the intrinsically moral considerations when buying a 
product, that is, the consumer’s own ethical norms and values, as well as the consumer’s 
sense of responsibility for the ecological and environmental issues related to the ‘green’ 
(or in the marine case ‘blue’) good. 
 Responsibility is also taken on by firms, which through their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) branches are becoming increasingly engaged in promoting and 
directing the sustainability agenda (Barin Cruz and Boehe 2008). For example, Bansal 
and Roth (2000) distinguish three types of motivations for firms to adopt CSR: (1) 
competitiveness, referring to the potential for CSR to improve long-term profitability; 
(2) legitimation, relating to the potential for CSR to improve a firm’s compliance with 
prevailing social and legal norms; and (3) responsibility, relating to a firm’s concern 
with its own social obligations and values. Corporate social responsibility can improve a 
firm’s long-term profitability by adopting a more proactive policy towards social and 
environmental regulation (Carroll and Shabana 2010), or by developing niche markets 
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for socially responsible products. Corporate social responsibility can also enhance a 
firm’s ‘licence to operate’, that is, its reputation among consumers, employees and, 
ultimately, voters and policy-makers. Finally, CSR can reflect a firm’s intrinsic values 
associated with their use of the (marine) environment, or promoting their own values in 
the practices of those purchasing their products – be it direct consumption of fish or 
experiences through marine tourism. 
 The three types of motivations identified by Bansal and Roth (2000) mirror the 
types of motivations for consumers as explained above, and can be characterized as 
instrumental motivations (reflecting the instrumental value of a good or initiative to the 
individual firm or consumer), social motivations (reflecting the value of a good or 
initiative in the relation between the firm or consumer and others) and ethical 
motivations (reflecting the value of a good or initiative as an expression of a firm or a 
consumer’s intrinsic moral values). A comparison of the three cases also shows there 
are concerns about the role of private actors in ocean governance. These concerns 
largely relate to the privatization of public concerns, and the erosion of state 
sovereignty. Regarding the first concern, Konefal (2013) argues that prioritizing the 
market and private actors can mean a select group of powerful individuals or firms (for 
example a company chief executive officer or a large corporation) has the power to 
decide what sustainability is, as opposed to allowing society more generally to make 
that decision. Similarly, others have been critical of the fact that the sustainability goals, 
and ways to approach those goals, should not be the responsibility of individuals, but 
rather the responsibility of public policy, in part because consumers can find navigating 
the sustainable consumption landscape confusing (Jacquet et al. 2010). This is all the 
more relevant when considering the consumer demand for any given environmental or 
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social value associated product – be it a certified fish or ethical resort conserving coastal 
habitat – outside markets that currently exhibit demand for sustainable ‘products’ (see, 
for example, Bush et al. 2013). However, as we go on to discuss, aligning private 
governance approaches to individual behaviour in a market overlooks a range of 
organizational outcomes that emerge through public–private interaction. 
 
Ocean Governance as Sustainability Partnerships 
Closely related to the kinds of public–private interaction evident in the marine 
environment is the emergence of sustainability partnerships. Going further than simply 
the interaction between states and private actors, partnerships indicate the increasingly 
blurred relations that exist between governments, firms and civil society actors. 
Sustainability partnerships work on the principle of combining the market-based power 
of lead firms with the legitimacy of states to regulate marine resources (Vellema and 
van Wijk 2015). By partnering with firms, states can better coordinate the 
implementation of both voluntary and legislated sustainability measures, and in doing 
so increase their influence over production and trade, as well as the sustainability of 
fishery resources (Adolf et al. 2016). However, the three cases outlined above indicate 
that the extent of this influence is limited to private initiatives that are directed towards 
international markets. For instance, by establishing de facto conditions for export 
market access, certification places stringent requirements on firms and states to comply 
with sustainability standards. If states and firms act alone to comply with these 
standards they incur increased costs and a higher risk of non-compliance. However, if 
partnerships are formed, then they have a higher chance of compliance and 
strengthening their position in the market. Similarly, as international requirements for 
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traceability increase in response to IUU regulation (as well as emerging issues of human 
trafficking), states and firms acting alone will be challenged in a similar way. While 
direct partnerships between companies and governments remain relatively rare in the 
marine environment (see, as exceptions, Bailey et al. 2016b; Adolf et al. 2016), there 
are a wide range of examples where civil society groups are providing a facilitative role 
in the development of sustainability partnerships, either by assisting the capacity of 
firms or states to meet legislative or voluntary market-based requirements, or by 
establishing dialogue between key actors to stimulate innovation in sustainability 
governance arrangements. 
 Despite the innovation surrounding these partnerships and their potential for new 
governance approaches, concerns have been raised. Returning to Konefal (2013), 
sustainability partnerships facilitated by apparently ‘neutral’ civil society have also 
reinforced control of companies over sustainability issues. In some cases these 
partnerships have been framed as being pre-competitive and providing an additional 
strategy to established private arrangements such as certification and traceability. 
Examples include industrial coalitions as seen in tuna fisheries with the International 
Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) and the Global Salmon Initiative (GSI) 
initiated in part by the WWF with major seafood companies. The result of this greater 
control remains unclear; it could result in considerable changes towards sustainability, 
but it may also enable firms to determine where and how they engage with 
sustainability improvements at timescales contrary to those initially intended. What this 
might point to is the need for a reinvigoration of these partnerships in new forms. 
 
Private Governance in Support of State Governance 
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Despite the fact that the emergence of private actors in ocean governance can be 
explained by ideas around citizenship, consumer preference, CSR and sustainability 
partnerships, the governing potential of these mechanisms remains intimately tied to 
states. States are more often seeking private actors and governance mechanisms to 
supplement state regulation and control over ocean resources. In practice, this leads to a 
range of different potential interactions between states and private actors. As outlined 
by Gulbrandsen (2014), these interactions can range from complementary, where states 
benchmark and/or learn from more stringent private standards or rules, to mutually 
reinforcing the legitimacy of state legislation, to improved performance through greater 
transparency of state actions through private mechanisms. In the three cases outlined 
above, we can observe all three forms of interaction. Certification, for instance, plays 
multiple roles. By referring to and referencing state rules and regulations in its standards 
and auditing schedules, certification can reinforce both national and international state 
arrangements. In cases where standards are set above what is legislated, certification can 
also push states to change and innovate regulation. 
 Traceability can play a similar role to certification where states have weak or no 
traceability systems in place. By creating new systems of control in supply chains and 
setting new standards for how transparent the fishing industry should be, it can increase 
firm accountability towards reaching sustainability goals. However, perhaps the clearer 
interaction traceability can play is increasing the information available on food safety, 
as well as sustainability aspects related to how fish were caught, where, by who and in 
what quantities (Bailey et al. 2016b). In this way, traceability can help states to support 
their sustainability governance and procurement strategies. For example, in the US, the 
Presidential Task for on Combatting IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud (NOAA 2015) 
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includes traceability in a key set of recommendations. However, what is also apparent is 
that the information required by certification and traceability mechanisms is very 
complex. On one hand, the private actors involved in these two examples can be 
expected to have better access to market information; on the other hand, the information 
they provide to consumers on species and fisheries characteristics, such as stock status 
and fishing effort, depends heavily on efforts traditionally taken up by the state. So 
while private-actor innovation and leadership may have emerged from more individual 
motivations to develop, contribute to and purchase from certified and traceable 
fisheries, collective uptake and facilitation by the state is essential. 
 
Conclusion 
The past few decades have seen a shift in ocean governance from a predominant role for 
public actors (that is, states and intergovernmental organizations) to partnerships 
between governments and private actors, including firms, consumers and civil society. 
This shift is visible in the emergence of seafood certification, traceability and 
entrepreneurial MPAs, all of which are largely initiated by private firms in partnerships 
with civil society and governments. Besides the immediate profit motive to firms, 
considerations of reputation and corporate social responsibility cannot be ruled out as 
motivations for firms to engage in these activities. 
 Examples in northern Europe and Thailand, where seafood certification was met 
with opposition from governments, suggest an initial suspicion that private governance 
may hamper public governance. Recent developments, however, demonstrate that 
private governance can also enhance states’ authority and legitimacy. Despite the bigger 
role for private actors in certification, traceability and EMPAs, all three forms of private 
 19 
 
governance also depend heavily on the state, for example, as a provider of necessary 
information to certification and traceability, and as enforcer of private property rights of 
EMPAs. Private governance can also lend national governments greater legitimacy 
through an endorsement by international bodies, as demonstrated by the MSC 
certification of the PNA unassociated-sets tuna fishery. 
 Potentially, the private governance arrangements described in this chapter can 
contribute to the SDGs as formulated in the post-2015 Development Agenda (United 
Nations 2015), particularly to the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources 
(Goal 14). The examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate that certification of 
sustainable fishery practices has drawn consumers’ attention to issues of overfishing 
and unregulated fisheries (Goal 14.4); the specific case of the MSC certification of the 
PNA unassociated-sets tuna fishery suggests that small island developing states (SIDSs) 
might also benefit from the improved access to the market offered by certification (Goal 
14.7). In a similar vein, traceability can help address illegal and unreported fishing 
(Goal 14.4), whereas EMPAs are a contribution to Goal 14.5 on the conservation of 
coastal and marine areas. 
 Nevertheless, a word of caution is warranted against depending on private 
initiatives to address what are, essentially, problems of coordination in open-access and 
common-property resources. Despite the added value of private governance, and the 
goodwill of those involved, it cannot guarantee that policy objectives in ocean and 
coastal management will be attained. An active role for governments will therefore 
remain warranted. 
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